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Clemency and the Administration of Hope
In 2014, President Obama announced his intention to
‘‘restor[e] fundamental ideals of justice and fairness’’ to the
criminal justice system by exercising his executive clem-
ency power to commute sentences of those who had
‘‘already served their time and paid their debt to society.’’1
Soon thereafter, the Department of Justice (DOJ) specified
six criteria it would use to prioritize applications.2 The
primary targets of these criteria were the casualties of the
war on drugs: people sentenced to draconian sentences for
nonviolent drug offenses, some of which involved less than
a handful of narcotics. Most of these individuals had
exhausted any available appeals years ago and resigned
themselves to spending the majority or all of their lives in
prison. With his 2014 announcement, President Obama
unsettled their expectations and revived their long-
abandoned hope that they would leave prison while their
parents were still alive, in time to see their children grad-
uate from high school or college, or, as many conveyed, in
anything other than a box.
This was not a surprising initiative from this President;
hope had been a central theme of his campaign and
administration. What was surprising is what my experience
working within this initiative for a year quickly revealed: he
lacked a realistic plan for how the petitions would make
their way to his desk under an expedited time line, or
a consistent vision for how broadly the initiative would
extend. And he seemed to miss completely that identifying
broad, largely subjective criteria that appeared to include
many, but ultimately excluded most, would have its own
casualties. He did not, in short, anticipate what it meant to
actually administer this hope-inspiring initiative.
This lack of clarity and foresight raised many questions
for clemency applicants and the attorneys who represented
them, including the staff of the Clemency Resource Center
at NYU School of Law. The Clemency Resource Center
(CRC) was a temporary, one-year ‘‘pop up legal services
office.’’3 We were a small office with a big mission: we were
to be a ‘‘factory of justice,’’4 the only law office in the
country dedicated solely to crafting clemency petitions tar-
geted at President Obama’s initiative. We were a team of
eight; I was the Executive Director, and supervised seven
ambitious and passionate lawyers and law graduates, most
of whom had been out of law school for less than a year.5
This essay reflects on our experience, which revealed sig-
nificant planning gaps in President Obama’s well-
intentioned, but poorly executed, initiative, and the conse-
quences of those oversights.
The very need for a dedicated office like the CRC
revealed an early, obvious challenge: who would have the
time, skill, and persistence to navigate the convoluted
clemency process, learn the relevant federal sentencing law,
and draft meritorious clemency petitions for the President’s
review—all within a narrow and unforgiving timeframe.
The President could have followed the suggestion of
clemency scholars and redesigned the clemency process to
expedite it and remove it from the DOJ—the very depart-
ment that prosecuted the individuals seeking relief.6
Instead, he opted to adhere to the conventional process,
which involves seven levels of internal review7 and tradi-
tionally takes about four years from application to decision.
In fact, the process developed to meet this initiative
increased, rather than decreased, the bureaucracy: petitions
were subjected to two additional rounds of review by
Clemency Project 2014 (CP2014),8 an independent orga-
nization that essentially acted as a link between clemency
applicants, volunteer lawyers, and the Administration.
Simultaneous with the announcement of the clemency
initiative, Deputy Attorney General James Cole promised
that individuals who appeared to meet the clemency criteria
would be ‘‘offered the assistance of an experienced pro
bono attorney’’ to prepare a clemency application.9 The
initial vision had been simple: CP2014 would recruit and
train volunteer attorneys, and this ‘‘army of pro bono law-
yers’’ would represent all eligible clemency applicants.10 It
soon became clear that this ‘‘army’’ was making little
headway,11 which prompted law professors Rachel Barkow
and Mark Osler to secure funding for the Clemency
Resource Center.12 The CRC worked closely with CP2014 to
identify applicants who met the DOJ’s criteria and file
petitions on their behalf.
We quickly learned that the only predictable aspect of
this process was its unpredictability, and the CRC would
have to remain flexible, persistent, and creative. The clem-
ency initiative, which lasted less than three years, spanned
two Attorneys General,13 two Deputy Attorneys General,14
and two Pardon Attorneys.15 And CP2014 repeatedly
changed its procedures for assigning cases, obtaining
documents, and reviewing petitions.
We knew we had a lot to accomplish in a limited amount
of time. But even ascertaining precisely how much time we
had proved elusive. Periodically CP2014 or the Office of the
Pardon Attorney would notify us that a deadline was
approaching, and if we did not meet that deadline, our
clients’ petitions may not be reviewed. The first rumored
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deadline was around November 2015, and every other
month or so we would hear of a new deadline. Yet, each of
those deadlines—even those that came directly from
Administration officials—proved to be unreliable.16
There were many obstacles to making quick work of this
big task, despite our enthusiasm and dedication. Some of
these obstacles resulted from bureaucratic issues that were
somewhat inevitable, but that could have been overcome
more quickly with assistance from Administration officials.
For example, all of our clients were within the control of the
DOJ’s Bureau of Prisons. The most efficient means of
communicating confidentially with our clients was
a phone call arranged by the client’s prison counselor.17
The DOJ, as part of its effort to ‘‘quickly and effectively
identify appropriate candidates’’ for clemency,18 could
have implemented policies to ensure clemency applicants
could talk with their attorneys quickly and confidentially.
Instead, it was not uncommon for CRC attorneys to make
multiple calls a day to the same facility, many days in
a row, before someone would answer the phone and agree
to arrange a confidential call.
Moreover, we could not meaningfully review the viabil-
ity of a potential client’s clemency petition until we obtained
the presentence investigation report (PSR). The PSR is
a confidential document prepared for the sentencing judge
by a probation officer and retained by the Bureau of Pris-
ons. It contains a description of the offense and related
conduct, a computation of the sentencing guidelines score,
and other information pertinent to the judge’s sentencing
decision. Under the processes in place when the CRC
opened, obtaining the PSR could take months. It was not
until the summer of 2015 that the federal judiciary imple-
mented an expedited procedure with the Bureau of Prisons
to disclose the PSR to an attorney in connection with
a possible clemency petition. Under this new process, PSRs
were often produced in a few weeks.
Once we finally established communication with
potential clients and obtained the relevant documents, we
could begin our review in earnest. Given our ever-
narrowing window of opportunity and demanding man-
date, we sought to prioritize representing individuals who
most embodied the spirit of the initiative, as judged by the
DOJ’s criteria. And here is where we faced our biggest
challenges, and those that the Administration had the most
power to address: interpreting the clemency criteria.
We were entering an uncharted territory. Clemency is
a completely discretionary power; there is no ‘‘clemency
law,’’ no precedent we could use to interpret the criteria.
The Administration could have announced demanding,
firm criteria that perhaps required skilled legal analysis to
address but, if satisfied, would essentially ensure the
granting of an applicant’s petition. Alternatively, it could
have offered more malleable, subjective criteria that ren-
dered many individuals possibly eligible, but perhaps did
not require the assistance of an attorney. Instead, it offered
a mixture of complex, technical criteria that required legal
analysis and subjective criteria that could be interpreted to
include many, without any guidance as to what the criteria
meant or whether individuals who satisfied all or most of
the criteria could expect relief. It was the worst of both
worlds: it left us unable to easily determine how to focus
our limited time and resources, and it raised the hopes and
expectations of many whose applications would, ultimately,
be denied.
Two of the six criteria were seemingly objective: first,
that the individual had served at least 10 years of his or her
federal sentence,19 and second, that his or her sentence
would be substantially lower today due to a change in law or
policy. This second factor was arguably the most important
and undoubtedly the trickiest to analyze. It required
a detailed knowledge of current and past federal drug sen-
tencing statutes and guidelines, Supreme Court jurispru-
dence regarding the sentencing guidelines, and changing
DOJ charging policies regarding mandatory minimums
and recidivist enhancements.
The remaining criteria, in contrast, were frustratingly
subjective, and confounded more than they clarified. One
could rack up enough criminal history points to receive
a middle or upper-range criminal history score with just
a few prior, low-level drug offenses. Would this history be
deemed ‘‘significant’’? Would a single high-level offense
that occurred decades ago be disqualifying? We faced sim-
ilar questions in discerning whether an individual would be
deemed to have a ‘‘history of violence.’’ A number of
potential clients had been involved with the drug trade
since their youth and, unsurprisingly, had been implicated
in violent offenses in their late teens. Yet these same people
were now decades older, and many had impressively
avoided incurring any disciplinary infractions, violent or
otherwise, during the intervening years. Would they con-
tinue to be defined by their serious, but youthful, infrac-
tions? And who, precisely, would be considered a ‘‘low-level
offender’’?
Of course, our clients had been pondering all of these
questions for the sixteen months between when the initia-
tive was announced and when the CRC opened. Unfortu-
nately, we did not have the answers. The resultant
ambiguity about the criteria and the process itself had
immense consequences: a wave of anxiety flooded the fed-
eral prison system as people who had settled into their
lengthy, draconian sentences began to wonder if they may
be eligible for clemency, if their term may end in months
instead of decades. Both clients and prison counselors
described the anxiety as palpable and conveyed that many
people were on edge as they tried to discern whether their
lives were about to change dramatically. And for some cli-
ents, this anxiety seemed to be particularly disruptive: a few
suddenly accrued disciplinary infractions, after years with-
out incident.
Such anxiety was perfectly understandable. The stron-
gest clemency candidates were those who were serving very
long sentences for very minor offenses, and who had
demonstrated that they nevertheless accepted their fate, as
evidenced by a clean disciplinary record and a history of
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successful prison programming. Many conveyed that, in
order to persist, they had stopped hoping, stopped dream-
ing about the possibility of life beyond the prison walls,
until this initiative was announced.
Despite all of the obstacles recounted above, the Clem-
ency Resource Center achieved a lot. We screened approx-
imately 700 cases to identify applicants for CP2014 who
appeared to meet the criteria and should be assigned
a lawyer. We represented 189 individuals and submitted
clemency petitions on their behalf, and the CRC team had
the honor of reporting to 83 clients and their family mem-
bers that their petitions had been granted.
Yet, the results of our efforts were as erratic and
unpredictable as the process itself, leading many to aptly
describe the process as a ‘‘lottery.’’20 The vast majority of
our 189 clients had similar stories: they had sold relatively
small amounts of crack cocaine or played a minor role in
a more substantial drug distribution conspiracy, had
a criminal history comprised primarily of a smattering of
drug-related offenses, had received sentences in the range
of about 20 years to life in prison, and had maintained
impressive prison records. Any violence in their record had
occurred long ago. They had families who loved them and
people in the community who offered them emotional and
material support, including housing and a job. Given these
striking similarities, why were barely 40 percent granted
relief?21 This result was all the more confounding because
some of the CRC clients who received clemency strayed
from this narrative in significant ways. One of the first CRC
clients to receive clemency was William Dekle, who was
serving two life sentences for flying planeloads of mari-
juana into the United States.22 Yet, the petition of Ferrell
Scott, who was also serving a life sentence for a marijuana
offense, and who had accrued only a single, non-violent
disciplinary infraction (for being 30 minutes late to his
work assignment),23 was denied.24 Such inconsistent
results were not limited to CRC; others have reported
similarly perplexing outcomes.25
Looking back, it is clear that part of this unpredictability
resulted from what we suspected but has now been con-
firmed: Administration officials often made decisions about
petitions based on off-the-record facts we could and would
never know, let alone be able to address in our petitions.
Former White House Counsel Neil Eggleston recently
explained, ‘‘I had more information about [clemency
applicants] than others did, including, frankly, their
lawyers. . . . when people say there was arbitrariness [in the
outcome of clemency petitions] it’s because they didn’t
know factors that I knew.’’26 This candid admission raises
significant questions about the role of advocacy in the
clemency process. For example, how could advocates gauge
the viability of applications without full information?
Moreover, if the Administration was going to consider
secret, but apparently dispositive, information, what was
the point of the extensive application process?
The inconsistent results were also likely influenced by
the fact that the very goal and purpose of the initiative
seemed to shift over time. Attorney General Holder’s early
prediction that approximately 10,000 individuals27 would
receive clemency signaled the initiative was originally
envisioned as a broad systemic correction, an attempt to
right the wrongs of the draconian drug sentencing laws.
The recent reflections of former White House Counsel Neil
Eggleston suggest that this purpose shifted over time.
He conveyed that President Obama believed that ‘‘[i]t
wasn’t enough that the person had just gotten too lengthy
a sentence. . . . He felt strongly that this was a gift, and the
gift had to be earned.’’ In other words, a grossly outsized
sentence—decades in prison, for example, for an offense
involving a handful of crack cocaine—was necessary, but
not sufficient, for the candidate’s application. Applicants
needed to demonstrate not only that they had been sub-
jected to a grave systemic injustice, but also that they
deserved an exercise of mercy. From this perspective, a few
significant, but remote, offenses on a criminal history or
prison disciplinary record likely were deemed disqualify-
ing. And the numbers bore this out: instead of 10,000
petitions, President Obama granted less than 2000. Ulti-
mately the initiative did not correct broad systemic wrongs,
but rather sparingly parceled out mercy.
Most members of the CRC team were less than a year
out of law school. They had to learn, quickly, how to instill
confidence in our clients about our expertise and skill while
being frank about the uncertainty of the process. To craft
a strong petition, they had to encourage their clients to plan
for a future they had abandoned. They then had to have
devastating conversations with these same clients, whose
hopes President Obama had unexpectedly raised, when
their revived hopes and dreams were just as unexpectedly
crushed by the denial of their petitions. In short, it fell to the
CRC team and other attorneys to actually administer the
hope this initiative inspired, and to address and manage the
emotional fallout from the abysmally managed clemency
initiative.
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